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The  primary  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  enhance  the  understanding  of  the  impact  of 
distribution channel conflicts on the channel efficiency, which has hitherto received little 
attention in distribution channel literature. Although ‘channel conflict’ as a construct is fairly 
well researched and its relationship with channel efficiency is explored to some extent, yet the 
moderating effect of the conflict resolution strategies on the channel efficiency is largely 
absent in the channel literature.  From a behavioral science perspective, the article models 
the  channel  conflict-efficiency  relationship,  for  three  different  types  of  conflict  resolution 
methods-problem  solving,  bargaining  and  politics,  in  the  context  of  asymmetric  power 
relationships.  The  managerial  implications  of  these  conceptual  models  lie  in  making 
organizations (channel captains), dealing with their channel partners, foresee the possible 
impacts  of  their  adopted  conflict  resolution  strategies,  on  their  channel  efficiency  and 
accordingly maximize returns on the channel investments.  
 
 
Conflicts are inevitable whether their results are functional or dysfunctional. From the 
organizational  perspective,  Katz  (1964)  has  provided  3  bases  of  conflicts-between 
different subsystems of the organizations and between units of similar functions –both of 
these sources deal with horizontal power equations. The third base of conflict is based on 
the hierarchy and arises between different groups over the sharing of rewards and status. 
(quoted in Hall, H. Richard, “Organizations Structures, Processes, and Outcomes, 8th 
Ed.,2002).The nature of conflict and their sources may be varied and may arise from 
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Intra-Channel Conflicts: A Behavioral Perspective 
 
Distribution  channel  research  has  been  viewed  from  perspectives  such  as  economic, 
institutional, functional, managerial and social schools. This paper focuses only on the 
social school perspective. Marketing channels have been treated as interorganizational 
systems and the channel has been conceptualized as a “super organization”, implying 
thereby that channels behave like complex social organizations or a social action system 
(Aldrich, 1976; Van de ven, 1976; Weick, 1965).Hence channel can be treated as a social 
system which exhibits the same behavioral process characteristics as that of all social 
systems, with conflict as one such process (Stern and Brown 1969).All the constituents of 
the distribution channel along  with  the  manufacturing organization may be  seen  as a 
behavioral  system.  The  different  actors  behave  as  goal  seeking,  role-defining,  power 
exercising  and  information  exchanging  entities  (Rosenberg  and  Stern,  1970).So  the 
conflict in channel is all pervasive and characterized by behavioral interdependence for 
mutual goal seeking. Literature is replete with conceptualizations of channel as a system 
which needs to be administered for effecting desired behavior and in order to maintain its 
operating  efficiency.  Bucklin’s  (1966)  conceptualization  of  a  ‘commercial  channel’ 
excludes the customers but includes in the administrative context all actors involved in 
the movement of products from point of production to point of consumption. 
 
Goldman (1966) has viewed conflict in channels as,‘a social relationship between two 
parties in which at least one of the parties perceives the other an adversary engaging in 
behaviors designed to destroy,injure,thwart or gain scarce resources at the expense of the 
perceiver ”. According to Raven and Kruglanski (1970), conflict is a “tension between 
two or more  social entities that  arises  from  the incompatibility  of actual and desired 
responses.”Boulding (1965) has given the concept of a threshold level of hostility above 
which  conflict  processes  are  ‘malign’  and  below  which  they  are  ‘benign’.  This  we 
conceptualize as the threshold level of conflict delimiting functional and dysfunctional 
conflicts. According to Eugene and Lydia (1962) even a complete absence of conflict 
would  be  dysfunctional  and  Stern  and  Heskett  (1969)  say  that  without  conflict  there 
would be no innovation. We extend this line of reasoning to state that the mere presence 
of conflict alone is not the only predictor of outcomes, instead it is the conflict resolution 
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outcome on channel effectiveness. The influence of conflict on the channel effectiveness 
can  be  treated  similar  to  Organizational  effectiveness  as,  “the  extent  to  which  an 
organization,  given  certain  resources  and  means,  achieves  its  objectives…  without 
placing undue strain on its members.”(Georopoulos and Tannenbaum, 1961) 
 
The Rosenberg-Stern Model of Conflict Process 
 
Rosenberg  and  Stern(1970)  have  hypothesized  that  below  the  threshold  conflict  there 
would be positive correlation between ‘level of conflict’ and the ‘outcome’- taken as 
financial performance(though other outcomes can also be taken) and similarly above the 
threshold conflict there would be a negative correlation between ‘financial performance’ 




      Causes   -----------------￿ ￿ ￿ ￿       Level-           ------------------------￿ ￿ ￿ ￿          Outcomes ￿  
       Structural & Attitudinal                                 Behavioral Reactions 
                          Factors                                        (Conflict resolution strategies) 
 
Causes-Level, Level-Outcomes and Outcomes-Causes are cause-effect relationship pairs. 
In the Rosenberg-Stern model, the causes of conflicts are identifiable though may not be 
deterministic, though it is associated with structural alignment of these firms and these 
causes of conflict lead to a certain level of conflict; the outcomes of this conflict lead to 
increase or decrease in the performance of the firms which is determined by the intensity 
of conflict. The shortcoming of this model is that it offers little insight on conflict’s effect 
on the channel efficiency. Nevertheless this descriptive model is good starting point for 
the proposed conceptual model in this paper. 
 
Rosenbloom Model of Conflict and Channel Efficiency 
 
According  to  Rosenbloom  (1973)  channel  efficiency  is,  “degree  to  which  the  total 
investment  in  the  various  inputs  necessary  to  effect  a  given channel decision  can  be 
optimized in terms of outputs.” Hence it implies the efficiency of resource utilization in 
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A  B 
C 
D 
O  E  F 
categorizes 3 effects of channel conflicts on channel efficiency-Negative effect where 
efficiency  and  conflict  are  negatively  correlated;  No  effect-where  channel  efficiency 
nearly remains same in spite  of an increase in conflict  and the  positive  effect  where 
efficiency of the channel increases with the increase in conflict due to factors such as 
increased motivation of one of the channel member to attain atleast one of the common 
goals. These 3 categories of relationships are clubbed into a Conflict-Efficiency graph, 
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Shortcomings of the Rosenbloom Model 
 
Though the Rosenberg-Stern Descriptive Model of conflict process and the Rosenbloom 
Conceptual conflict-efficiency Model both are essentially in agreement with each other, 
the  latter  additionally  talks  about  the  conflict-efficiency  relationship  in  the  channel. 
Taking both the models together, we can probably predict that if the cyclicity of cause-
level-outcome-cause- is maintained as claimed by Rosenberg-Stern model, the general 
curve does not stop at point D. But depicting the conflict-efficiency relationship in the 
above manner requires more precise determination of the threshold levels of conflicts OE 
and OF.OE is the level of conflict within the particular channel before one or more of the 
members’ action/s makes the channel efficiency goes up. Similarly OF is the level of 
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manufacturer firm, it is very important to know the point E and F as these points are 
critical for most optimal utilization of channel resources. It is also very important for the 
manager of the manufacturer firm to know as to what kinds of action are bearable for the 
conflict before it reaches point C, and after reaching that point how to sustain the channel 
equilibrium there, so that the channel efficiency is maximum. 
 
The points E and F would depend to a large extent on the conflict resolution strategies 
which would determine the outcomes of these conflict and hence the level of efficiency of 
the channel. Also, since this model is oversimplified, we know that conflict efficiency 
relationship between B to C and again from C to D would not be linear, though the 
constant linear relationship from A to B would hold mostly true in many cases.  
 
Hence we deduce that conflict resolution strategies will play a critical moderating role in 
the  determination  of  points  B,  C  and  D.Also  we  are  not  sure  if  the  point  D  would 
eventually lie above point  A or  below  it. Suppose D lies above A,  then it is  always 
beneficial  for  the  manufacturer  organization  to  attain  D,  for  higher  efficiency  as 
compared to A and vice versa if the opposite holds true. 
 
Conflict Resolution Processes: Moderating Effect on Channel Efficiency 
 
The four main processes of conflict resolution given by March and Simon (1958) are: 
Problem  Solving,  Persuasion,  Bargaining  and  Politics  and  has  been  widely  supported 
(Sheth 1973; Butaney 1989; Lambert, Boughton, and Banville 1986 –as quoted by Dant 
and Schul in, “Conflict Resolution Processes in Contractual Channels of Distribution,” 
Journal of Marketing; Jan 1992; 56, 1) 
These four conflict resolution strategies can be summed up as: 
 
1.  In problem solving approach, there is a priori common objective and the solution 
arrived at generally meets both members’ criteria of decision making.  
2.  In bargaining, the disagreement is acknowledged to be present by all members; 
the  common  goal  may  or  may  not  be  present  and  may  even  include  threats, 
promises, positional commitments and nonconcessionary behaviors. (March and 





IIMA  ￿  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
Page No. 7  W.P.  No.  2006-11-02 
3.  Politics approach signals the failure of all the above internal processes of conflict 
resolution and the members now want to resolve their conflict through mediation 
or arbitration of a third party, which may be a potential alley. (Dant and Schul 
1992) 
4.  In Persuasion, one of the channel member tries to change the perspective of the 
other member by calling focus on the super ordinate goal, hence a persuasive 
element is present here, unlike in problem solving approach. 
 
Dant  and  Schul  (1992)  provided  a  framework  for  the  choice  of  conflict  resolution 
strategies  in  symmetric  and  asymmetric  settings  (one  of  the  channel  members  is 
dominant). Their study broadly concludes that: 
1.  Politics  is  the  most  preferred  approach  when  stakes,  non-dominant  member 
dependence and complexity are high and  
2.  Problem solving approach is most preferred when risk, stakes, complexity and 
non-dominant member dependence is low. 
 
An Improvised Conflict- Efficiency Model 
 
Based  on  the  Rosenberg-Stern  conflict  process  model  and  taking  the  Rosenbloom 
conflict-efficiency model as starting point and integrating both with the Dant and Schul 
framework of  the conflict resolution method, a  new model for the  Channel  Conflict-
Efficiency is proposed: 
 
Key Features and Assumptions in the Model: 
1.  Asymmetrical  power  relationship  between  the  channel  members.  This  is  possible 
especially between the manufacturing firm and any of its channel members. 
 
2.  It  comes  out  from  the  Dant  and  Schul  framework  that  Problem  solving  (PS), 
Bargaining (B) and Politics (PO) are the most dominant conflict resolution strategies. 
Hence the channel conflict-efficiency models for each of these strategies are proposed, 
assuming that only one strategy is adopted by manufacturer firm. Hence it is a pure and 
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3. For each of these 3 strategies a conflict-efficiency model is proposed as it is argued that 
the channel efficiency would certainly depend on the conflict resolution strategy adopted 
by the dominant firm and that its aftermath would be different in each case. 
 
4. It is also argued that until a certain level of conflict, the channel efficiency does not 
change (Similar to the Rosenbloom model) and after that the nature of the curvilinear 
relationship between the channel conflict and channel efficiency would depend on the 
method of the conflict resolution strategy adopted by the dominant firm. 
 
5.  Though  it  is  categorically  difficult  to  classify  any  disagreement  between  the  two 
channel members as functional or dysfunctional conflict, the proposed model presupposes 
that disagreements may arise after usual communications have led to some level of tacit 
or explicit agreement upto a point (or on certain issues) and also disagreement on other 
issues. Though agreements and disagreements are independent of each other and are issue 
specific, it is also a function of the type of conflict resolution strategy to a great extent. 
The model assumes that disagreements leading to dysfunctional conflicts arise after a 
certain level of agreement has been reached (functional conflict) on some of the issues of 
mutual  interest  (as  both  the  actors  also  have  vested  interests  in  maintaining  the 
relationship).Hence  dysfunctional  conflict  is  always  preceded  by  functional  conflict, 
though the  intensities of  both  might  be different. In  the proposed models, conflict is 
mostly functional (though it might have some elements of dysfunctionality) till point C 
and becomes more dysfunctional after point C till point D. 
 
As predicted by Rosenbloom Model, initially there would be a stable functional level of 
conflict and the channel would be operating at a certain level of efficiency. Suppose Sales 
managers  from  manufacturing  organization  insists  on  higher  sales  from  the  channel 
members  (dealers)  without  further  investments  like  trade  incentives,  sales  promotion 
programs etc., the dealers would initially be motivated to increase their sales as they 
themselves would benefit from higher sales. Hence the efficiency of the channel increases 
from level at point A to a higher level of efficiency -point C.After a certain level of 
functional conflict has been built into the system, if the sales managers further pressurize 
the channel members (dealers) to increase their sales and off take from the manufacturer, 
the dealers will start resisting this move and may even refuse in some cases. Hence a 
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trust in the relationship and a  point may  be reached, though rare, where the channel 
members would refuse to budge and may disagree to meet the goals of the manufacturer 
as they would find it contrary to some of their own goals.  
 
At this point of time, if third party intervention results for managing the conflict between 
the manufacturer and the dealers (after the failure of the communication between these 
two actors), suppose through a court settlement or an arbitrator, then that would result in 
immediate  fall  in  channel  efficiency  as  the  relationship  between  the  two  actors  gets 
adversely affected as an aftermath of this conflict resolution strategy. 
 
That efficiency increases with increase in conflict till point C, and reduces with increase 
in conflict after point C till point D is in consonance with the concept of functional and 
dysfunctional  conflict.  Rosenberg  and  Stern  (1970)  had  in  their  descriptive  model, 
predicted that below the conflict threshold, higher the level of conflict, higher would be 
the financial performance and above the conflict threshold, the higher the conflict, the 
lower  would  be  the  financial  performance  outcomes.  Channel  efficiency  can  also  be 
viewed  as  one  form  of  financial  performance  outcome  from  the  manufacturer  firm’s 
perspective. Hence, the rising nature of relationship between B and C and falling nature 
between C and D is justified. This explains the nature of relationships in all the 3 models 
proposed, but the differences among them arise as a result of the different outcomes of the 
conflict resolution strategies on channel efficiency and this is where the proposed models 
depart from the Rosenbloom model. 
Conflict-Efficiency Models: 
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The difference among the 3 proposed models: A General Explanation 
 
The  essential  difference  among  the  3  proposed  models  is  the  nature  of  relationship 
between points B-C and C-D.We explain as below: 
 
1.  The Conflict Aftermath (Point D) :In case of PO form of conflict resolution, the 
level of mutual trust reduces to the least, as compared to B or PS.Hence at the 
conflict aftermath ,after point C,efficiency falls very sharply till point D, which lie 
below point A, which means that the final level of channel efficiency would be 
lower than that of initial level as Politics as conflict resolution strategy connotes, 
that communication between the two channel members have weakened or even 
broken  down  and  for  resolution  of  the  conflict  as  third  part  mediation  was 
necessitated. Hence the trust in the relationship is also reduced. In case of PS, 
since the conflict was resolved amiably between the two channel members, hence 
the trust is still maintained for future working relationship. This would result in 
higher level of channel efficiency (point D) compared to the initial point A. Hence 
the efficiency falls more gradually. In case of bargaining, its hypothesized that 
point D would still lie higher than point A (supposing threats are not solely used 
as part of the resolution process), but it would be lower compared to PS, because 
in case of bargaining the level of trust as the aftermath of conflict is lower than 
PS, due to the nature of the conflict resolution strategy (Bargaining may even 
involve threats and non-amicable communications.).The efficiency falls gradually 
till point D. 
 
2.  The Peak Channel Efficiency (Point C): At what level of conflict will the channel 
efficiency peak cannot be generalized. It would depend on situation faced by the 
two channel members. The model predicts- how the relationship between channel 
conflict and channel efficiency is likely to change with the 3 different conflict 
resolution strategies for the same dyad in similar context or situation. 
The  model  also  suggests  that  efficiency  is  likely  to  be  maximized  when  the 
functional level of conflict just gives way to dysfunctional conflict. Hence point C 
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From  the  interpersonal,  intra-organizational  perspective  also,  the  above  results 
seems to have support. Meyer, Gemmell and Irving (1997) concluded from their 
study of interpersonal conflict within organizations that, perceived fairness was 
achieved  at  the  expense  of  efficiency.  Hence  it  can  be  argued  that  since  PO 
resolution  strategy  involves  third  party  involvement  in  meting  out  the  justice 
between the manufacturer and the dealer/s, it is perceived to be fairer than other 
strategies like PS and B, and hence would result in a lower level of efficiency than 
the two. These authors also found in their analysis of six intervention strategies 
that  Arbitration  was  more  likely  to  lead  to  subordinate  satisfaction  than  an 
efficient  resolution.  Here  it  is  argued  that  since  arbitration  is  involved  in  PO 
strategy, it is deemed to be fair and the outcomes more likely to satisfy the dealer, 
but  the  result  is  not  always  efficient.  This  conclusion  supports  the  Model 
proposed. Hence  in  PO  model,  we should expect a sharp drop  in the  channel 
efficiency immediately upon arbitration, which would be lower than of the initial 
efficiency. 
 
3.  The Relationship A-B-C-D: The main difference between these 3 models is the 
nature of relationship shown in the models by points B-C-D. 
This can be illustrated through a simple example of an automobile manufacturer 
and its dealer/s.Suppose the auto firm want to increase its auto sales through its 
dealers from currently 100 cars per month to 150 cars per month. The dealers do 
not find a huge stretch in selling 100 cars and they are able to maintain the same 
level  of  efficiency,  though  they  feel  the  firm’s  pressure  to  achieve  the  sales 
targets. (Illustrated as relationship A-B).  Suppose the auto firm announce a trade 
incentive of Rs 1000 per additional car sold beyond 100 cars. This motivates the 
dealers to sell more than 100 cars, even though they need to stretch now. They 
may need to employ an additional salesman to fetch orders from new potential 
customers and this may entail additional expenditure. Although the dealers may 
perceive  a  conflict  that  the  goal  of  selling  more  than  100  cars  may  not  be 
necessarily achieved (though the expenditure would be incurred), they still would 
try for it. Hence the perceived level of conflict rises, but the efficiency also rises 
as many of the dealers would achieve the goal of selling more than 100 cars to 
untapped potential customers. This motivation, with perceived or even manifest 
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by the auto firm spurs the dealers to sell more and more cars. Suppose at point C 
(say, 125 cars) the dealers start feeling the pressure of not being able to sell more, 
even with incentives. If the auto firm still wants to motivate them to sell more than 
125 cars, the firm may increase the incentive to say, Rs 2000 per car. The firm 
may  also  expect  the  dealers  to  increase  their  inventories  to  meet  unexpected 
demands from customers. This would mean more investment from the dealers and 
they may not be willing to invest more, without seeing tangible benefits from it. 
At this point they may refuse to increase their inventories and may even reduce 
their sales to below 125 cars, hence reducing the channel efficiency. Even more 
incentives from auto firm may not be able to motivate them and if pressure is put 
on them the communications may become unamicable leading to reduced trust. 
  Here the role of conflict resolution strategies will affect the relationship B-C-D: 
 
If the auto firm, in order to increase its sales from 100 cars to 150 cars wants its 
dealers to increase inventories (which the dealers are skeptical of and resist) and 
the firm chooses PS strategy, then it would sit down with the dealers and listen to 
their concerns and try to work them out and find a mutually acceptable solution 
which may work till point C (say 125 cars sales with higher inventory) at a lower 
level of conflict than other strategies like PO and B; but still the dealers may 
refuse  to  increase  sales/inventories  beyond  125  cars.  This  leads  to  drop  in 
efficiency (fall from point C to D).At point D, the firm may choose another way 
of incentivising the dealers which they might find motivating. In the PS strategy, 
the efficiency would increase gradually, from 100 cars to 125 cars with some 
incentives for dealers till point C, beyond which the efficiency may fall down to 
say, 110 cars (point D) 
 
On the contrary, if the auto firm would have applied bargaining strategy instead of 
PS, and in order to increase sales from 100 cars to 150 cars, would not have given 
any  incentives  to  dealers,  but  only  pressurized  them  to  sell  more(  and  even 
threatening them for adverse consequences for failing to meet their targets), the 
dealer would have yielded upto a point (point C) by increasing their sales till say 
110 cars, beyond which they would have refused and infact may even reduce sales 
to say 105 cars. Point C would be probably reached at higher level of conflict due 
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In case of Politics (PO), the auto firm would probably not give enough incentives 
to dealers and yet expect (or pressurize) them to increase off take from 100 cars to 
150  cars.  The  dealers  under  extreme  pressure  may  refuse  to  increase  their 
offtake.This  might  lead  to  loss  of  communication  between  the  two  channel 
members  and  the  entry  of  third  party  in  form  of  a  common  ally  may  be 
necessitated  to  make  the  two  members  establish  relations  again.  Suppose  an 
arbitrator is appointed to settle the issues between auto firm and its dealers and the 
arbitrator  reaches  a  mutually  acceptable  agreement  with  the  two  members  to 
increase  the  sales,  there  is  a  likelihood  that  the  sales  would  increase  only 
minimally(less than that expected by auto firm) say from 100 to 110 cars and that 
too  if  the  firm  gives  its  dealers,  incentives  for  selling  additional  cars  beyond 
100.Thus channel efficiency is increased, but little for the same level of conflict. 
After point C is reached, the dealers may loose the motivation to increase sales 
beyond 110 cars and may resist again. They may even reduce the sales to 100 or 
less cars. This would result as the trust between the auto firm and the dealers is 
reduced and the presence of third party arbitrator further reduced their motivation 
as the direct channel of communication between dealers and manufacturer is not 
working completely. Hence the relationship as shown by B-C-D is expected. 
 
Issues of Measurement for Empirical validation of the Model 
 
Conflict Measurement in Distribution Channels 
 
Several methods can be taken for conflict measurement. One such measure as provided 
by  Stern-Heskett typology  is the distance  between  reciprocal  members’  perception of 
issues, which are predictors of conflict. (Several other measures can also be employed.) 
Hence  level  of  conflict  varies  directly  with  disparity  in  channel  member’s  goals, 
dissensus about the domain conceptions among members and differences in their relative 
perceptions of reality among the two actors. Broadly, conflict has been studied in one of 
the  following  3  states  (Assael,1968;  Pruden,1969;  Rosenberg  and  Stern,1971; 
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1. Manifest Conflict: Frequency and Intensity of conflict is the main conflict dimension 
measured 
2. Affective Conflict: Intensity of conflict is measured. 
3. Perceived Conflict: Intensity of conflict is measured. 
 
For the purpose of this study, manifest conflict can be chosen. In manifest conflict, there 
are  6  measures  given  by  Brown  and  Day  (1981),  namely  based  on:  frequency  of 
disagreements (F), Intensity of disagreement (N) and Importance of the disagreement for 
the channel member (I): 
Measure 1: F 
Measure 2: N 
Measure 3: FxN 
Measure 4: F+N 
Measure 5: FxNxI 
Measure 6: F+N+I 
Though  each  of  these  6  measures  are  considered  to  be  unidirectional  measures  of 
manifest channel conflict, the last four composite measures are considered better as they 
contain more information about the interaction process between the manufacturer and the 
dealer. 
For  each  of  these  measures,  certain  important  issues  are  chosen  which  are  then 
individually  measured  and  finally  a  composite  sum  is  arrived  at.  The  study  done  by 
Brown and Day (1981) relates to automobile dealers where they considered the 15 issues 
to important, some of which are: 
Vehicle Inventory, Number of salesmen, Number of Mechanics, Manufacturer provided 
management  assistance,  physical  facility,  vehicle  allocation,  vehicle  delivery,  parts 
inventory, dealer advertising and other issues. 
 
Measure of Channel Efficiency 
 
Measurement  of  channel  efficiency  though  is  not  thoroughly  researched,  but  such 
measures  as  %  reduction  in  channel  investment  in  achieving  the  given  outcome,  as 
suggested by Rosenbloom can be taken as a reliable measure. 
Efficiency can be directly measured and one of the most common measures can be taken 
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channel member, say dealer. It may in form of total trade incentives and sales promotion 
budget spent on achieving a particular level of sales. For example, as in the above case, if 
the auto firm in order to sell 100 cars per month needs to spend Rs 50,000 on dealer 
promotions and Rs 20,000 on co-advertising, then its total investment would be Rs 70,000 
for getting 100 cars sold or Rs 700 per car. If suppose now the auto firm is able to sell 
100 cars by spending less, say Rs 40,000 on dealer promotions and Rs 10,000 on co-
advertising, then it’s reduced investment for selling 100 cars is Rs 50,000 or Rs 500 per 
car. Hence it has saved Rs 200 per car as investment. Hence the channel efficiency would 
increase by (200/700) * 100% or 28.5%. 
 
Conceptual Models: Implications and direction for future research 
 
Though  the  nature  of  the  relationship  is  approximate,  empirical  studies  need  to  be 
conducted  in  order  to  validate  these  models.  The  important  point  that  these  models 
illustrate are the differences that conflict resolution strategies can bring to the nature of 
the conflict-efficiency relationship and the final outcome. More research is needed to 
further refine the models and robustness can be built into it by validating the models 
empirically.  The  significance  of  these  conceptual  models  lies  for  both  the  channel 
members, specially the manufacturer, which can then accordingly maximize the returns 
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